This report examines a less-studied category of Russian-linked foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) targeting Moldova during the 2024 – 2025 election cycle: bespoke, “grasstops” influence operations aimed at policymakers, think tanks, journalists, academics, and elite networks in the United States and Europe. While much existing analysis emphasizes mass-audience social media manipulation in Romanian and Russian, the cases here show how Kremlin-linked actors exploit Western institutions and commercial influence infrastructure to shape policy and perceptions of Moldova’s democracy and EU accession.
Across four case studies, the report documents a consistent pattern of reputation laundering and narrative distribution. First, Shor-linked astroturf entities – most notably the International Center for the Protection of Human Rights and Democracy (ICPHRD) and Stop Media Ban – used ostensibly pro-EU, rights-based messaging to portray Moldova as authoritarian, censorious, and unfit for EU integration. These campaigns relied heavily on PR intermediaries and a network of pseudo-media outlets that mimic journalism while selling sponsored influence, enabling content placement with deceptive bylines and the appearance of independent reporting. The report also highlights information-laundering dynamics whereby paid placements can be republished, recycled, and re-imported into Moldovan media as “authoritative foreign coverage.” Second, the report analyzes lobbying efforts linked to Ilan Shor’s political ecosystem, including a documented U.S. contract with Qorvis for presidential candidate Vasile Tarlev and later outreach by Fortius Consulting on behalf of Victoria Şapa. These examples illustrate how financial opacity and weakened enforcement of transparency frameworks can facilitate private influence efforts even when formal legal regimes exist. Third, the report presents original analysis of a “blogger delegation” organized via Russian Orthodox Church structures and led by Charles Bausman, generating long-tail English-language content aimed at niche far-right audiences and, indirectly, U.S. decision-makers. Finally, the report examines the 2025 MEGA conference in Chișinău as a hybrid influence event marked by opaque financing and post-event English-language amplification through familiar pseudo-media channels. Synthesizing these cases, the report identifies core enabling tactics: astroturf organizations with shallow infrastructure; the use of PR / lobbying firms as “agnostic” contractors; and gaps in EU-wide lobbying transparency, sponsorship labeling, and financial due diligence. The concluding assessment finds a clear strategic shift from broad, values-based outreach in 2024 toward narrower targeting of far-right MEGA / MAGA-adjacent networks in 2025 – an evolution aligned with both opportunistic political timing and deeper ideological convergence.