[et_pb_section bb_built=”1″][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light”]<\/p>\n
\u00a0Strangely different constituencies.<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n When we start to consider nine constituencies of Chi\u0219in\u0103u it becomes clear that DPM and \u0218or party again don\u2019t match the statistic as DPM results differ drastically in different constituencies while other properties of these constituencies show otherwise.<\/p>\n Some notes.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n in constituency<\/td>\n Table 6. Leader\u2019s results in constituencies.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n (2014 LP + LDPM)<\/td>\n Table 7. Ratio of standard deviations and means division of DPM, Acum and PSRM by constituencies of Chi\u0219in\u0103u. Parliament elections of 2014 and 2019 comparison.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n It\u2019s all starting to make sense now.<\/p>\n Here, a question arises: why in all other constituencies statistics is more or less regular? It\u2019s barely plausible that there were several times more falsifications in the one half of the city than in another one. Our calculations help to suggest two main reasons:<\/p>\n -Falsifications in some constituencies actually were somewhat smaller than in other ones, or, speaking precisely, somewhat different.<\/p>\n -Smaller the falsifications are, smoother they are. I.e. these falsifications are more homogenous between different polling stations and they \u201cdistort\u201d statistics to a lesser extent. This issue will be reviewed more thoroughly.<\/p>\n Pictures 2-4 allows to further visualize picture and consider simultaneously several additional indicators that characterize the irregularity of DPM votes.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][et_pb_image _builder_version=”3.0.85″ src=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/Capture-2.jpg” show_in_lightbox=”off” url_new_window=”off” use_overlay=”off” always_center_on_mobile=”on” force_fullwidth=”off” show_bottom_space=”on” \/][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light”]<\/p>\n Picture 2. Pair correlation DPM, Acum and PSRM by constituencies of Chi\u0219in\u0103u.<\/em><\/p>\n Picture 2 helps to look at the issue of \u201cirregular DPM statistics\u201d in more detail. In turn, it helps to make some new answers.<\/p>\n It turns out that correlation between PSRM and Acum results is quite regular in all the constituencies. Correlation of PSRM and DPM results are moderately falling beyond the scope of our model. But in the case of correlation between DPM and Acum irregularities are apparent, although being of various scales in different constituencies.<\/p>\n The DPM electorate, when being considered from statistical point of view (not regarding irregularities of all types), is closer to Acum, and it cannot vary depending of the constituency. It\u2019s absolutely impossible for DPM and Acum results to be tied by a strong positive correlation in two constituencies while being tide by a weak negative correlation in other three ones, as all other indicators are the same. We\u2019ll stress again the data for constituencies 26, 27 and 29 where DPM has two (!) cases of negative correlations with leading parties. Translated into common language from the statistical one, it means that in several constituencies DPM has its small electorate (separated from two large electoral arrays), while in other constituencies it doesn\u2019t. It\u2019s also worth mentioning that districts\u00a0 26, 29 and, to some extent 27 are exactly the most socially prosperous.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n This brings us to the extremely important issue on how different types of falsifications affect statistical indicators.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Comparison of pic.2 and 3 helps to make several new conclusions.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n 1.Constituencies with the most \u201ctroubled\u201d statistics i.e. 26, 27 and 29 have relatively high share of votes for DPM, negative correlation with Acum, and very low correlation with 2014 results.<\/p>\n 3.It\u2019s easy to see in picture 4. In this picture a very irregular constituency \u211631 is added to the constituencies 26, 27 and 29 discussed above, but it\u2019s result of the strong influence of the \u201cpersonal factor\u201d of ex-prime minister Gaburici. In this constituency the correlation between DPM results in the majority system and candidate result in the single-member constituency is the lowest observed.<\/p>\n Making our task more complex, we\u2019ve put the data of pictures 2 and 3 together into the new multi-factor complex and determined the partial correlation coefficient between DPM results in a certain constituency in 2014 and correlation between DPM and Acum results in 2019. We\u2019ve got apparently irregular, unstable and volatile connection.<\/p>\n Three conclusions are obvious. -Irregularities have surely taken place, although it\u2019s necessary to describe why the statistics is more distorted in some cases than in other ones.<\/p>\n -The question of how could constituency properties influence results by themselves seems pretty legitimate. In neither of constituencies DPM has pretended of victory even remotely, so the difference between constituencies shouldn\u2019t be so significant.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][et_pb_image _builder_version=”3.0.85″ src=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/Capture-3.jpg” show_in_lightbox=”off” url_new_window=”off” use_overlay=”off” always_center_on_mobile=”on” force_fullwidth=”off” show_bottom_space=”on” \/][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light”]<\/p>\n Picture 3. Multiple correlation model. Partial correlation of leaders\u00a0 – 2014 and 2019 Parliamentary elections. (Acum to the sum of LP and LDPM at 2014).<\/em><\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][et_pb_image _builder_version=”3.0.85″ src=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/2.jpg” show_in_lightbox=”off” url_new_window=”off” use_overlay=”off” always_center_on_mobile=”on” force_fullwidth=”off” show_bottom_space=”on” \/][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light”]<\/p>\n Picture 4. Multiple correlation model. Partial correlation Acum and DPM at 2019 to DPM at 2014.<\/em><\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light”]<\/p>\n Comparison of pictures 3 and 4 gives important additional information about connection of DPM and ACUM electorate.<\/p>\n One can call Picture 4 the \u201cDPM pitchfork\u201d or \u201ctrident\u201d. In this picture use of the mathematical modeling has allowed to obtain two completely different forms of correlation while the aforementioned computations show that both of them are irregular. So, different types and combinations of irregularities lead to different effect and different final statistics. Meanwhile, there are no doubts that irregularities organized by DPM and to a lesser extent by the \u0218or party have taken place in all the constituencies, varying in \u201cvolume\u201d and \u201ctechnology\u201d.<\/p>\n Conclusions.<\/strong><\/p>\n 2.That\u2019s why most prosperous constituencies (26, 29 and, to a lesser extent, 27) give the lowest correlation of DPM results in\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 2019 with their results during the previous periods, as people who have voted DPM in 2019 and in 2014 are almost non-overlapping groups.<\/p>\n Furthermore, carousel is easy to detect, ballot replacement could be seen on a CCTV record, so some preparations are required to avoid suspicion. Therefore, carousels are still being used but \u201cowners of the administrative influence\u201d haven\u2019t pay special attention to them. The amount of carousels in the recent elections can be estimated to be significantly lower than 1%, and not more than 2000-2500 votes.<\/p>\n Often the owners of such \u201celectoral know-hows\u201d are the most interested themselves in carousels to earn some easy money during elections. Although, this doesn\u2019t exclude that in the proper place and at the right time carousels can become important tool for electoral fraud.<\/p>\n Obvious advantages of carousels include the following:<\/p>\n -High reliability, i.e. it\u2019s almost impossible to detect the \u201cowner\u201d. In the worst case, an intruder will be caught with one completed ballot.<\/p>\n -Very high efficiency. As all the ballots are checked by the \u201cowner\u201d of the know-how, probability of \u201cgroup member\u201d of voting wrong is very small. It\u2019s important advantage of carousels compared to nets (which we\u2019ll discuss below)._<\/p>\n -Last but not the least carousels don\u2019t distort statistics. Very thorough analysis of electoral databases can be used to detect traces of carousels, especially if their use has been systematic. But it\u2019s hard to do and cannot yield unquestionable proof as such small fluctuations can occur spontaneously.<\/p>\n During the recent elections, nets have been widely used in Moldova for the first time but it\u2019s use was rather specific.<\/p>\n 8.1. Nets were almost mixed with another kind of falsifications \u2013 \u201cvoter impersonation\u201d, which had yielded higher effect in the specific background of Moldova. Generally, this two kinds of falsifications are somewhat similar<\/a>, although having clear differences.<\/a><\/p>\n 8.2.Absence of total control by \u201cgroup leader\u201d and reliance on a ordinary member are important features of nets. In Moldova and Ukraine experience has shown that if real rating of nets beneficiary is less than 15-20%, nets can fail, because many participants get their fees but vote for another party.<\/p>\n 8.3.The specific nature of Chi\u0219in\u0103u political landscape has turned out to be even more important than it seemed. It\u2019s obvious that there are no DPM ordinary activists in Chi\u0219in\u0103u, so participants were mostly right-flank activists or just young people with developed communicative skills. Ultimately, many of them voted for Acum, despite Acum had nothing to do with this. That\u2019s one of the reasons of high correlation coefficient between DPM and Acum results.<\/p>\n It\u2019s wrong to assume that circumstances described above had made use of nets useless for DPM. In Chi\u0219in\u0103u, basically, yes, but in Moldova as a whole the situation was completely different. There, nets and voter impersonation played a crucial role in many cases.<\/p>\n It\u2019s easy to see the volume of nets and voter impersonation by analyzing excess of electoral activity over the normal distribution in the hours before noon.<\/p>\n In Chi\u0219in\u0103u, nets cover 4-5% of all votes, but not all of its participants voted for DPM and \u0218or party, and it\u2019s evident in the constituency 31 where everything had been prepared for nets use. In the country as a whole the situation is drastically different as described below.<\/p>\n 9.Voter impersonation isn\u2019t unique invention of Moldova (see<\/a>\u00a0here<\/a>) but it had turned out to be very effective \u201chere and now\u201d.<\/p>\n The technology is based (as always) on largescale and strong administrative influence and widespread manipulations with citizens register. Added to this is the specific nature of situation in Moldova \u2013 at least 20-25% of population isn\u2019t present in the country, DPM fully controls the mayors of rural communities, hence fully controlling electoral commissions. The result was \u201cold technology\u201d enhanced with new ideas specific to Moldova.<\/p>\n At some moments, especially from the statistical point of view it\u2019s hard to separate nets and voter impersonation. In Chi\u0219in\u0103u voter impersonation almost didn\u2019t influence \u201cinternal statistics\u201d (however, nets did) but made a large impact of \u201cexternal\u201d one (i.e. connected with electoral activity). Actually this is voter impersonation that helped DPM to increase its result by approximately 4-5% in Chi\u0219in\u0103u (and much more in Moldova as a whole) with little effort.<\/p>\n Brief summary.<\/strong> DPM was prepared for falsifications in Chi\u0219in\u0103u, and their preparations were versatile and systematic. Approximately 10% of total votes in the city are irregular, and DPM got about 75% of them. But DPM had managed to realize only part of its plans, because of negative attitude towards DPM of most of the city residents (in cities other than Chi\u0219in\u0103u the situation is mostly the same) and\u2026 because of insufficient administrative influence. DPM had to face that many of people engaged to take part in the falsifications actually took no action or even opposed them.<\/p>\n In the countryside, however, situation had turned out to be much more favorable for DPM.<\/p>\n To be continued.<\/p>\n [\/et_pb_text][et_pb_button _builder_version=”3.0.85″ button_text=”Download the study” button_url=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/Irregularity-analysis-part-3.pdf” url_new_window=”on” button_alignment=”center” background_layout=”light” custom_button=”off” button_icon_placement=”right” animation_style=”fade” \/][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" [et_pb_section bb_built=”1″][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light”] \u00a0Strangely different constituencies. \u00a0 When we start to consider nine constituencies of Chi\u0219in\u0103u it becomes clear that DPM and \u0218or party again don\u2019t match the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":205172,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"off","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[43],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-205180","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyzes"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/205180","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=205180"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/205180\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/205172"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=205180"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=205180"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=205180"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
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\n Constituencies<\/td>\n Neighborhoods<\/p>\n PSRM<\/td>\n Acum<\/td>\n DPM<\/td>\n \u201cSor Party\u201d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 23<\/td>\n 4<\/td>\n 40.1<\/strong><\/td>\n 35.7<\/td>\n 9.9<\/td>\n 11.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 24<\/td>\n 1<\/td>\n 48.8<\/strong><\/td>\n 31.7<\/td>\n 9.6<\/td>\n 8.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 25<\/td>\n 6<\/td>\n 40.1<\/td>\n 42.7<\/strong><\/td>\n 11.7<\/td>\n 5.4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 26<\/td>\n 5<\/td>\n 36.8<\/td>\n 37.3<\/strong><\/td>\n 11.3<\/td>\n 5.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 27<\/td>\n 6<\/td>\n 33.5<\/td>\n 41.5<\/strong><\/td>\n 12.4<\/td>\n 6.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 28<\/td>\n 3<\/td>\n 38.3<\/strong><\/td>\n 35.1<\/td>\n 9.6<\/td>\n 8.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 29<\/td>\n 4<\/td>\n 43.5<\/strong><\/td>\n 36.7<\/td>\n 11.1<\/td>\n 5.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 30<\/td>\n 1<\/td>\n 33.4<\/td>\n 40.8<\/strong><\/td>\n 11.8<\/td>\n 6.9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 31<\/td>\n 5<\/td>\n 38.6<\/strong><\/td>\n 34.7<\/td>\n 13.2<\/td>\n 7.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n \n
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\n Constituencies<\/td>\n DPM<\/td>\n Acum<\/p>\n PSRM<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n 2019<\/td>\n 2014<\/td>\n 2019<\/td>\n 2014<\/td>\n 2019<\/td>\n 2014<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 23<\/td>\n 18.7<\/td>\n 18.1<\/td>\n 17.9<\/td>\n 17.1<\/td>\n 17.0<\/td>\n 22.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 24<\/td>\n 16.7<\/td>\n 19.4<\/td>\n 18.9<\/td>\n 21.4<\/td>\n 15.6<\/td>\n 17.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 25<\/td>\n 19.1<\/td>\n 21.3<\/td>\n 19.7<\/td>\n 21.9<\/td>\n 23.8<\/td>\n 27.1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 26<\/td>\n 12.6<\/td>\n 16.4<\/td>\n 7.4<\/td>\n 11.2<\/td>\n 11.9<\/td>\n 18.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 27<\/td>\n 22.0<\/td>\n 13.5<\/td>\n 12.4<\/td>\n 15.7<\/td>\n 15.8<\/td>\n 21.5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 28<\/td>\n 18.6<\/td>\n 18.8<\/td>\n 19.8<\/td>\n 22.1<\/td>\n 23.3<\/td>\n 27.3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 29<\/td>\n 22.0<\/td>\n 16.8<\/td>\n 14.1<\/td>\n 17.0<\/td>\n 14.2<\/td>\n 16.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 30<\/td>\n 15.6<\/td>\n 10.8<\/td>\n 11.7<\/td>\n 10.6<\/td>\n 18.8<\/td>\n 20.0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Constituency 31<\/td>\n 16.2<\/td>\n 14.8<\/td>\n 14.7<\/td>\n 20.2<\/td>\n 14.1<\/td>\n 18.2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n \n
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\n-That simple cannot be right; the data obtained contradicts itself to a certain degree.<\/p>\n\n
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