[et_pb_section bb_built=”1″][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light” text_orientation=”justified”]<\/p>\n
\nThe study examines the legislation and the process which designs the delimitation of the<\/strong><\/em>
\nuninominal constituencies in the Republic of Moldova. The author’s conclusion is that<\/strong><\/em>
\nmost of the recommendations of the Venice Commission have not been taken into<\/strong><\/em>
\naccount in the process of amending the legislation, and the delimitation of constituencies<\/strong><\/em>
\nhas been non-transparent, contrary to the recommendations of the Venice Commission<\/strong><\/em>
\nand the national legislation. The result of the formation of constituencies is<\/strong><\/em>
\ndisadvantageous to voters in the Diaspora and favors the parties that have promoted the<\/strong><\/em>
\nmodification of the electoral system, which is contrary to good international practices.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Totally, out of the 28 recommendations of the Venice Commission within the law 154\/2017, only 9 were fully respect, partially or formally \u2013 only 5, not at all \u2013 14. In the final draft law approved on July 20, 2017 by the Parliament, contrary to the statements of the supporters of the electoral system changes, only 32% of the Venice Commission\u2019s recommendations are found. 50% of them are not
\nfound at all.\u00a0During the creation of the constituencies, most of the recommendations of the Venice Commission have been ignored. Even worse, many provisions of Moldova\u2019s own legislation have been disregarded. The Moldovan electoral reform is an international innovation in matters of subordinating electoral laws and regulations to the interest of a governing group. I don\u2019t think there are similar cases when, in a single move, the rules for the next elections are changed so radically and with so many infringements of democratic norms. An electoral system like this cannot be found in any other parliamentary republic with a single-chamber Parliament. Already in the first stage, the changes favored PDM and PSRM. In the second stage, the new and vague laws have been applied in a discretionary way to create a politically obedient commission. Next, this commission drew up the electoral constituencies in an equally
\ndiscretionary manner, applying and interpreting the Electoral Code according to its own interests. As a result, over two-thirds of all constituencies don\u2019t fit the legal requirements. Nine of them bear clear signs of political design – gerrymandering and malapportionment. The result of the commission\u2019s nontransparent work is that PSRM candidates are at an advantage in most
\nconstituencies.<\/p>\n[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_button _builder_version=”3.0.85″ button_text=”Read entire study” button_url=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/Gerry-Mandering-2.0-eng.pdf” url_new_window=”off” button_alignment=”center” background_layout=”light” custom_button=”off” button_icon_placement=”right” \/][et_pb_button _builder_version=”3.0.85″ button_text=”Download annex 1″ button_url=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/Anex-1.pdf” url_new_window=”off” button_alignment=”center” background_layout=”light” custom_button=”off” button_icon_placement=”right” \/][et_pb_button _builder_version=”3.0.85″ button_text=”Download Annex 2″ button_url=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/Anex-2.pdf” url_new_window=”off” button_alignment=”center” background_layout=”light” custom_button=”off” button_icon_placement=”right” \/][et_pb_button _builder_version=”3.0.85″ button_text=”Download annex 3″ button_url=”https:\/\/watchdog.md\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/Anex-3.pdf” url_new_window=”off” button_alignment=”center” background_layout=”light” custom_button=”off” button_icon_placement=”right” \/][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
[et_pb_section bb_built=”1″][et_pb_row][et_pb_column type=”4_4″][et_pb_text _builder_version=”3.0.85″ background_layout=”light” text_orientation=”justified”] The study examines the legislation and the process which designs the delimitation of the uninominal constituencies in the Republic of Moldova. The author’s conclusion […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":204760,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"off","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7,9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-204759","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","category-studies"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/204759","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=204759"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/204759\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/204760"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=204759"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=204759"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/watchdog.md\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=204759"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}